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THE EXCEPTION THAT BECAME THE RULE
John Schatz, Jr.*
In Anglo-American Jurisprudence it has been traditional that a defendant
in a criminal case can be tried only for the offense charged in the accusatory
pleading. Evidence of other independent crimes that have no direct tendency
to prove a material fact involved in the crime charged is inadmissible. How-
ever, to this general rule there are several exceptions.
Evidence of other crimes is always admissible when such evidence tends
directly to establish the particular crime charged, and such evidence is
usually competent to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident,
,a common plan. scheme or design, or 'the identity of the person charged
with the commission of the crime for which the defendant is on trial.
The main objection to the admissibility of such evidence centers about
the prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant's case in the minds of
the jurors. There can, however, be no question but that in some cases
evidence of other criminal acts may have a substantial degree of probative
value. When plan, scheme or design evidence is admitted under a limiting
instruction it is generally concluded that the probative value of the evi-
dence outweighs the prejudicial effect and the fact that such evidence may
tend to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors is no ground for
its exclusion. It is also held that the remoteness of the prior wrongful con-
duct affects only the weight of the evidence, and not its admissibility.' Thus
in California it has been held proper in a murder case for the prosecution
to introduce evidence of a murder committed by the defendant some
eighteen years prior to the murder for which the defendant was on trial.2
The admissibility of plan, scheme or design evidence is not determined
by the nature of the offense charged, but rather by the degree of common
features that exist between the prior wrongful conduct and the crime charged.
The degree of similarity between the two must be such as to warrant a
strong inference that if the defendant committed the prior wrongful act he
probably committed the crime charged. The initial determination of the
degree of similarity is for the trial judge, and where a sufficient degree of
similarity exists between the prior wrongful conduct and the offense charged,
the appellate courts have upheld the admissibility of such evidence under
the plan, scheme or design exception.
There are many examples of plan, scheme or design evidence having
been admitted in many different types of cases. The following examples,
while by no means complete, will serve to illustrate a few situations where
this particular type of evidence has been admitted.
1. Murder; People v. Lisenba.3 During the trial of the defendant
on a charge of murdering his wife for her insurance, the prosecution
introduced evidence tending to show that the defendant had murdered
a prior wife for her insurance.
2. Conspiracy; People v. Malone.4 On a charge of conspiracy to
commit abortion, it was held admissible to introduce testimony that prior
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to the offense charged the defendant had, on separate occasions, per-
formed abortions on two women in another county.
3. Pandering; People v. Bell.5 Similar acts of pandering were ad-
mitted in evidence.
4. Rape; People v. Cassandras.6 In a prosecuion for forcible rape
upon one woman, the court admitted testimony to show that five
months prior to the act charged, the defendant, under similar circum-
stances, had raped another woman.
5. Abortion; People v. Vosburg.7 It was held proper to introduce
evidence of other abortions performed by the defendant on three
women other than the complaining abortee.
6. Sodomy; People v. Westek.8 In a prosecution for sodomy and
lewd conduct with boys, evidence that the defendant had committed
similar offenses on other boys was held admissible.
The general plan, scheme and design exception has frequently been held
applicable to show other burglaries, larcenies, forgeries and robberies where
the other offense was committed under circumstances similar to the offense
charged.
The versatility as well as the utility of plan, scheme and design evidence
is uniquely demonstated in the two People v. Sullivan9 cases. The defendant,
Sullivan, frequented a dance hall where he met a young woman, danced
with her, asked to take her home, drove to a spot near a park, encouraged
her to drink whiskey, and when she resisted his advances struck her and
raped her. Upon his arrest Sullivan was charged with forcible rape and
entered a plea of not guilty. While on bail awaiting trial, he went to an-
other dance hall, met another young woman, danced with her, asked to
take her home, drove to a spot near a park, encouraged her to drink
whiskey, and when she resisted his advances struck her and raped her.
During the trial on the first rape charge evidence of the second similar
offense was held admissible to show a plan, scheme or design.
Thereafter Sullivan was tried on the second rape charge, and during the
course of the trial the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of
the defendant's similar offense as establishing a plan, scheme or design.
Anotier of the unusual aspects of the admissibility of plan, scheme and
design evidence is the absence of any requirement that the defendant be
convicted or even charged with the prior offense. In fact,. several California
cases have concerned themselves with the issue of whether or not evidence
of a prior offense would be admitted where the defendant was charged with
said prior offense and the charge was thereafter dismissed.1o
5. 138 Cal. App. 2d 7 (1955).
6. 83 Cal. App. 2d 272 (1948).
7. 123 Cal. App. 2d 535 (1954).
8. 31 Cal. 2d 469 (1948).
9. 96 Cal. App. 2d 742 (1950); 101 Cal. App. 2d 322 (1950).
10. People v. Brown, 168 Cal. App. 2d 549 (1959); People v. Fox, 126 Cal. App. 2d 560(1954).
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These cases established that a dismissal of such prior charge does not
preclude the introduction into evidence of the prior offense if such evidence
is otherwise admissible. Once the admissibility of such prior offense had
been established, three California cases permitted evidence of the prior of-
fense where the defendant had been charged, tried and acquitted of the prior
offense. 1
The multitude of cases coming within the exception to the general rule
supports the conclusion that in recent years the exception has been so
utilized that the rule has become the exception and the exception the rule.
11. People v. Spahn, 28 Cal. App. 2 299 (1938); People v. Lachuk, 5 Cal. App. 2d 729
(1935); People v. Follite, 74 Cal. App. 178 (1925).
